Exchanging Experiences, Expanding Opportunities

News feed

Printer-friendly version

Designer Donna Karan brings to Washington, DC a collection of Haitian art and handcrafts, June 11-27.

Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe will speak at the official opening of the Discover Haiti art and handcrafts exhibit at IDB Cultural Center.

What happens when there are too many men (and not enough women)? They become entrepreneurs, work harder and longer, and save more. That’s what two researchers revealed in a new IFPRI study on the economic impact of too many marriage-eligible men in 1960s Taiwan.

The third International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) and IFPRI Impact Evaluation Seminar will be webcast live on September 6. Renos Vakis of the World Bank will speak about lessons from a randomized experiment on cash transfers and childhood development in rural Nicaragua. Shareen Joshi of Georgetown University will act as discussant.

The study combines policy analysis matrix (PAM) and data envelopment analysis (DEA) techniques to evaluate the profitability and competitiveness of maize, rice, and soybean production in Ghana. The efficiency of a sample of maize, rice, and soybean growers from four districts of Ghana is analyzed using DEA, while profit maximizing groups of farmers were also identified. Then, PAMs were computed under observed average and profit-efficient farming conditions.

PDF file: 
application/pdf icon

gsspwp28.pdf(274.5KB)

By Kate Almquist -

This blog was originally featured at AllAfrica.com.

In her recent Foreign Policy column, “The Pivot to Africa,” Rosa Brooks made a plea for letting go of comfortable old assumptions about roles and missions between the civilian and non-civilian sides of the US government, particularly when it comes to US civil-military cooperation in Africa. My plea is for an evidence-based discussion of US development policy and its intersection with US national security.

US interests will be ill-served if we merely move from comfortable old (and false) assumptions about poverty and terrorism in Africa to comfortable new (and equally false) assumptions about “whole-of-government responses” to complex challenges. While the United States should of course think and work creatively, skepticism and, dare I say, opposition, from civilian agencies to AFRICOM taking on non-traditional military roles is not rooted in turf battles but in legitimate concerns about efficiency and results.

In terms of comfortable old assumptions about poverty and terrorism, the reality is far more complex than “poverty breeds terrorism.” We know from empirical research that underlying “root causes”–socioeconomic, political, and cultural drivers of violent extremism–are important.

However, their salience varies greatly from one situation to another, their role is more often indirect than direct, and they are best understood in conjunction with other factors– for example, the influence of a charismatic leader; the quest for dignity, recognition and respect; or a profound sense of marginalization and victimization.

If the Defense Department’s humanitarian assistance in Africa is intended to prevent or counter threats to the United States from violent extremists, then these programs should be predicated on context-specific analysis of likely drivers of violent extremism and be independently evaluated to verify that the programs are effective. There is no evidence of either.

This has gotten lost in the rush to comfortable new assumptions about whole-of-government responses to complex challenges. AFRICOM was intended to be a new breed of geographic command: non-kinetic (no longer in the wake of the operation in Libya), whose primary objective would be to lend security sector support to diplomacy and development efforts to “prevent problems from becoming crises, and crises from becoming catastrophes.”

Specifically, it “would help build the capacity of African countries to reduce conflict, improve security, deny terrorists sanctuary and support crisis response.” Accordingly, interagency participation in the command (for instance, one of two deputy commanders would be a civilian) would ensure that its efforts supported US diplomacy and development efforts.

In other words, AFRICOM was intended to support civilian efforts to confront drivers of violent extremism, not to attempt to do so directly.

Unfortunately, AFRICOM’s mission was muddled when it was launched in 2007 and remains muddled today. As Brooks writes,

“The Pentagon is right to see poverty, underdevelopment, disease, repression, human rights abuses, and conflict as likely drivers of future security threats to the United States. And if the Defense Department’s job is to defend the United States, the mission must surely include preventing threats.”

Yet the fact that “poverty, underdevelopment, disease, repression, human rights abuses, and conflict” persist in many African countries is the result of myriad factors. Their mere existence does not make any of them a driver of transnational violent extremism. Nor is it evidence that civilian-led development and diplomatic efforts in these regards have failed or that a void exists that the Defense Department (DOD) must step into.

At the time AFRICOM was announced, US development-related assistance to Africa totaled nearly $9 billion; security assistance amounted to $250 million, or 1/36th of non-security related assistance. The proportion is still roughly the same now. If we look more specifically at DOD’s so-called humanitarian assistance in Africa–more or less what we call development assistance in the civilian world–it is not clear that the Defense Department even knows how much it is spending.

Through some budget sleuthing, it appears that AFRICOM spent around $150 million on development and health-related activities in FY2011; 87% of this was HIV/AIDS-related. That left $17 million in “humanitarian assistance” for countering the “likely drivers of future security threats to the US”–hardly an amount to get excited over, much less see lasting impact from. In contrast, USAID’s Africa bureau alone programmed more than $4.1 billion in development assistance for FY2011. (This excludes food aid and emergency response programs; Millennium Challenge Corporation funds; and other State-funded, non-security sector programs.) The militarization of US aid to Africa is a myth.

What I found irksome about the discussion at the time AFRICOM stood up–and I still find irksome today–is the suggestion that USAID’s initial grumpiness at spending staff time and program resources to help AFRICOM do work that it had minimal resources and no competency or experience to do was somehow a sign of being unreasonable, short-sighted, and turf conscious. The real root of this grumpiness came from understanding that “development is more than improvements in people’s well-being: it also describes the capacity of the system to provide the circumstances for that well-being,” to borrow some words from my colleague, Owen Barder. Development is not simply providing an input (digging a well or handing out used clothes) that improves a person’s well-being for only as long as the assistance is provided.

Yet there is still little evidence that the Defense Department grasps that development is more than temporary fixes, much less that it understands how security and development intersect in specific situations. Introducing any resource into a resource-scarce environment is an inherently political act, affecting the haves and have-nots. The non-security sector programs DOD conducts are largely ad hoc and without regard for a broader development strategy or plan to support lasting change. In fact, they are explicitly intended to increase the visibility, access, and influence of DOD above all else.

While USAID is not a perfect agency when it comes to fostering development around the world, it is a serious professional institution with more than 50 years of development experience, lessons learned, expert staff, resources, and credibility with the peoples and governments where it works. In Africa, security is a pre-requisite for development; AFRICOM’s role in helping to professionalize African militaries is vitally important to achieving US governance and development objectives there. DOD and USAID should be informed of the other’s priorities and coordinate strategies and efforts where it makes sense; some organizational integration can help this. But that does not mean either should attempt to do the other’s job.

Development done badly is not only a waste of taxpayer resources; it’s harmful to the societies we’re trying to assist and detrimental to the rest of the US government’s development efforts–and, by extension, to our broader national interests. If development progress in Africa is important to our national security, then it’s too important to leave it in the hands of newcomers without the knowledge, expertise, mandate, or resources to help promote it effectively. If that’s what whole-of-government means, then we should expect outcomes that fall far short of our goals.

 

By Nancy Birdsall -

This is a joint post with Milan Vaishnav and Danny Cutherell.

In a recent blog post, Pakistani economist Anjum Altaf lambasted our recent report on the US development approach to Pakistan, “More Money, More Problems,” for not being sufficiently skeptical of the US development program, especially the US aid program, in Pakistan. Dr. Altaf criticized our 2011 report too. You can review last year’s discussion here.

His criticism comes as a pleasant surprise, since here in Washington we’ve been accused of being too critical of US efforts. In an era of grade inflation, many inside government felt our report card of US progress in Pakistan was unduly harsh. Facing pushback from both sides, perhaps this is a sign we have done something right?

His central critique of our recent report is that it does not question the assumption that foreign aid – and particularly aid provided by the United States – can solve Pakistan’s problems. That is odd because in our report we are very clear that aid will not solve Pakistan’s problems. Dr. Altaf exclusively quotes from an op-ed we published in the Pakistan daily, Dawn, so do we wonder if he has actually read our report (We hope so!).

The title of Dr. Altaf’s post is “Aid as Religion,” and he accuses us, in essence, of operating as zealots employed by the Church of Blind Faith in Foreign Assistance. He apparently has not read my “Seven Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings,” (published in a book edited by Chief Aid Heretic William Easterly) which would be grounds for ex-communication from said church; or our critique (with Adeel Malik) of the World Bank’s lending to Pakistan’s social sectors in the 1990s.

Dr. Altaf compares our exhortations to the governments of the US and Pakistan on development issues to that of a cleric encouraging the faithful to pray harder, despite a lack of evidence for divine intervention. His riposte includes too many points for us to address individually here, so perhaps its best for us to simply and clearly re-state the core messages of our recent report, which we did not have the luxury of summarizing in our recent op-ed:

  • It is in America’s own long-term interests to live in a world in which Pakistan is better able to grow economically, meet its citizens’ basic needs, and reduce domestic conflict, insecurity, and instability. Fundamentally, this requires the establishment of a more capable and effective democratic Pakistani state.
  • This transformation, if it is to occur, must be led by Pakistanis—inside government as well as outside. US government officials and aid bureaucracy staff  should discard the notion that Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB)—or any other donor intervention—is going to be transformational in a fundamental sense; at best, it can catalyze modest progress. And external assistance, as we have pointed out in both of our reports, must be grounded in three principles: humility, clarity of mission, and patience.
  • Three years into KLB, it is clear that the United States has a comparative “disadvantage” in managing aid programs in Pakistan. History and superpower status aside, the United States faces severe bureaucratic and internal hurdles planning and executing development projects in Pakistan—and throughout the developing world (but especially in countries where America’s security and development interests are in friction).
  • Given US government failures in concept, strategy and execution (not to mention reform failures on the part of the government of Pakistan), which we detail in the report, the United States needs to change course in Pakistan. It could start by taking five concrete steps:
    1. Signal its commitment to a serious dialogue on development with the government of Pakistan on the country’s practical and technical development challenges. This should proceed in a manner entirely independent of future aid spending.
    2. Recognize that “more money” has led to “more problems” in the US development approach. KLB’s plan for the US to spend $7.5 billion in 5 years was too ambitious, both for Pakistan (where reform is a bigger constraint to progress than lack of money) and for the US development machinery. The US should reduce expected annual aid while signaling its long-term commitment to Pakistan’s development hopes by extending the KLB timeframe from 5 to 10 years.
    3. Acknowledge that the US cannot play a productive role directly addressing all of Pakistan’s core development challenges. It is simply better in some areas than others. Furthermore, many of America’s core strengths reside on the “non-aid” side of the house: these include trade (increasing market access) and private investment (such as encouraging private sector investment through agencies like OPIC).
    4. On aid, the US should separate the “financing” and “delivery” of assistance. This means in areas where the US lacks core competency, it should either co-finance with other donors with a track record of success and channel more funds through multilateral channels. These are ideas that Dr. Altaf himself proposed in his critique of our report last year.
    5. Irrespective of the approach the US adopts, it must be more transparent and less focused on getting credit for its actions. Transparency matters in two areas: clarifying what exactly it is doing in Pakistan; and publicizing performance metrics of projects and the overall program. Are we blinded by our unquestioning faith in US foreign assistance to do good in Pakistan? We think the report speaks for itself.

Are we blinded by our unquestioning faith in US foreign assistance to do good in Pakistan? We think the report speaks for itself.

By Kimberly Ann Elliott - This is a joint post with Edward Collins. Can we assess ag aid quality?  The short answer: sort of. For at least a decade,  aid effectiveness has been in the spotlight because of concerns that, in some cases, aid may do more harm than good and, more recently, because of growing budget pressures.  In 2005, [...]

Pages